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This paper specifies and estimates a structural model of international migration using micro data. 
This provides a direct test of human capital theory that suggests that individuals respond to the 
earnings differentials across countries while making their migration decisions. The paper 
specifies migration as a joint outcome of two decision makers, i.e. the individual who decides to 
apply for migration and the host country that reviews applications, and identifies the factors 
determining the decision of these two players. The empirical results provide evidence in support 
of the human capital model. It is also shown that both the host country and the individual have 
significant impacts on the resulting characteristics of immigrants. The results suggest negative 
self-selection at the application stage both in terms of observed and unobserved characteristics 
and a positive selection at the review step by the host country. Although there is negative self-
selection in terms of schooling among applicants, as a result of the positive selection at the 
review step the resulting migrants are positively selected. However, in terms of unobservable 
characteristics the review step is unable to reverse the negative self-selection that occurs at the 
application stage, and the resulting migrants are negatively selected in this dimension.  
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1.     Introduction 
The literature studying international migration recognizes that immigrants arriving at 
various host countries are not randomly selected from the populations of the sending countries. 
The human capital theory postulates that these individuals are self-selected as they respond to 
earnings differentials between the source country and the host country. There is a large literature 
based on this working assumption. Although this key assumption has been tested directly in 
internal migration literature by constructing the earnings differences for movers and stayers, such 
a test has not been done in the international migration context. Also in the international migration 
context while it is recognized that immigrants are a self-selected sample, both the theoretical and 
the empirical literature ignores the selection of immigrants by the immigrant receiving countries. 
What determines the resulting selectivity of immigrants, both in terms of observed and 
unobserved characteristics, is this double selection process.  This paper tests the human capital 
theory in the international context and provides evidence about the nature of selection in terms of 
observed and unobserved characteristics of the immigrants. The paper distinguishes between the 
self-selection of immigrants which forms the applicant pool for migration and the selection by 
the host country which determines who is accepted among the applicants. The separate effects of 
this two-step selection process on the characteristics of immigrants are identified.  
The difficulty with the testing of the human capital model in this context lies primarily in 
the need to construct counter-factual earnings estimates, i.e. what the earnings of an immigrant 
would have been had that individual not migrated, and vice-versa for non-migrants. Secondly, in 
any given data set, contrary to the internal migration process, it is possible to identify either only 
immigrants, as in the case of a Census from a host country, or only non-migrants as in the case of 
a Census from a sending country. Hence, to study the international migration process it becomes 
necessary to use data from both the source and the host countries. Thirdly, immigrant receiving   
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countries has very important effects on the resulting selectivity of immigrants through their 
immigration policies. This feature of the process needs to be incorporated in the empirical 
testing. For example, Canada and Australia selects their skilled immigrants through a points test. 
Among the applicants only those who posses the characteristics that earn them sufficient number 
of points are admitted while the rest are rejected. In the United States special visas are allocated 
to different industries that have demand for skilled workers and employers bring in skilled 
immigrants through these visas. European countries such as Germany used ‘guest-worker’ 
programs to bring in workers to be employed in certain industries most of them becoming 
permanent immigrants. Therefore what determines the resulting selectivity of the international 
migration process is not only the supply-side which determines the self-selection as recognized 
by the literature but also the visa rationing by the host country. 
Among the studies of internal migration Robinson and Tomes (1982) is the first paper to 
test the responsiveness of individual migration to the earnings differentials by constructing 
opportunity wages of individuals; that is the wages of migrants had they stayed and of stayers 
had they moved. Their empirical results offer strong support for the human capital model. There 
are only few studies studying the determinants of international migration (Lucas, 1985, Taylor, 
1986, O Grada, 1986, Stark and Taylor, 1991, and Adams, 1993). These studies use data sets 
collected from the immigrant sending countries, generally covering small areas, which can 
identify individuals who emigrated from the country. These studies look at the relationship 
between the migration decision and several individual and household characteristics such as age, 
schooling, marital status, home ownership, household income and household size. While 
providing important insights about the correlation between such characteristics and the outcome 
of migration, these studies are limited in a number of ways. Firstly, immigration policies of the 
host countries are completely ignored. This prevents estimation of the structural parameters of   
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interest underlying individuals’ desire to migrate and also any analysis of the immigration policy. 
Secondly, the data used in these studies are generally collected from small areas that generated 
emigrants in the past and are not representative of the source country. While some of this data 
have information about the household income in the source country, they don’t have any 
information about post migration outcomes such as the host country earnings or income of the 
individuals that migrated.  To my knowledge there is no study in the international context that 
uses nationally representative data sets for both the source and host countries and tests the human 
capital model. 
This paper tests the effects of earnings differentials between the host country and source 
country by constructing the opportunity wages similar to Robinson and Tomes (1982). 
Moreover, in doing so the paper explicitly models the selection of individuals by the host country 
and hence the effect of immigration policy.  Estimation of the model and the opportunity wages 
also provide important insights about the selectivity of observed and unobserved characteristics 
of immigrants. The selectivity of immigrant characteristics has been the subject of a series of 
papers in the literature. Early literature on international migration assumes a favorable selection 
among immigrants in terms of both observed and unobserved characteristics. This positive 
selection argument is used to explain the finding in cross-sectional studies of immigrant earnings 
that age-earnings profile of immigrants crosses the age-earnings profiles of natives with same 
observed characteristics after ten to fifteen years after migration. This is explained by the 
unobserved characteristics of immigrants who may be more able and more highly motivated 
(Chiswick, 1978). This view has been challenged by Borjas (1987) who developed a model of 
immigrant self-selection based on the model of Roy (1951) where the focus is on selectivity in 
unobserved characteristics
1. The theoretical model demonstrates that immigrants may not 
                                                           
1 Borjas (1991) extends this framework and discusses selection in terms of observed characteristics.   
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necessarily be positively selected as is commonly assumed. The Roy model suggests that 
country-specific characteristics of the income distribution (and mobility costs) determine the 
unobserved quality of immigrants. Macro level data reflecting the economic and social 
conditions of the sending countries relative to the host country (U.S.) at the time of migration is 
included in the estimated equations of immigrant-native entry wage differentials. The key 
variable is the one measuring the income inequality and is calculated as “The ratio of household 
income of the top 10 percent of households to the income of the bottom 20 percent of the 
households” (Borjas, 1987). Borjas argues that if earnings between the host country and the 
source country are positively and strongly correlated, positive selection in terms of unobserved 
characteristics is observed whenever the host country has more income inequality then the source 
country and negative selection is observed otherwise. The empirical testing of this model, 
however, resulted in mixed results and led to some controversy in the literature.
2  Although the 
empirical results provide some evidence supporting the model, the variable measuring the 
relative income inequality doesn’t always have the expected sign or the statistical significance 
(Borjas, 1987, Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1990, Borjas, 1990, Borjas, 1991, Cobb-Clark, 1993). In 
the empirical studies of immigrant selectivity the list of and motivation for the macro level 
variables are necessarily ad hoc which leads to much of the criticism and the mixed results 
(Cobb-Clark, 1993). Chiswick (1999, 2000) argues that the measure used for household income 
inequality may be poorly related to the relevant variable of relative skill differentials. The 
primitive parameters in the Roy model that determine selectivity in terms of unobserved skills 
describe the dispersion in opportunities for a given level of socioeconomic characteristics. Borjas 
(1987) admits that the income inequality in the income distributions used in the empirical 
analysis do not correspond exactly to those parameters as they are affected by a host of other 
                                                           
2 See Borjas (1987), Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990), Borjas (1990), Borjas (1991), Cobb-Clark (1993) and Chiswick   
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factors. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990) further argue that results of Borjas (1987) are sensitive to 
the choice of source countries included in the analysis. Greenwood and McDowell (1991), and 
Cobb-Clark (1993) note that immigration policy is not taken into account in this literature and 
they include variables in their reduced form equations on an ad hoc basis trying to capture these 
effects. Their results suggest that immigration policy is important in determining observed 
outcomes.
3  
Estimation of the model of this paper along with the opportunity wages provides direct 
evidence on selectivity of observed and unobserved characteristics. Moreover, the paper goes 
one step further and highlights the importance of selection by the host country which has been 
largely ignored in the literature. The empirical results in this paper support the human capital 
model with the evidence showing that wage differentials between the host and the source country 
affect the migration decision in the predicted direction. This is the first direct evidence in 
international migration context in favor of the human capital model. The results also show that 
both the host country and the individual each have significant impact on the outcome of 
international migration. Finally, estimation of the model, wage equations and predicted earnings 
of immigrants in the source country provide evidence on selection issues. The results suggest 
negative self-selection at the application stage both in terms of observed and unobserved 
characteristics which is consistent with the predictions of the Roy model. However, when the 
predicted earnings of immigrants in the source country are compared to the predicted earnings of 
non-migrants it is shown that they come from the upper end of the income distribution. This 
result is due to positive selection that occurs at the review step by the host country which shows 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(1999, 2000) 
3 Borjas (1987) assumes that visa restrictions enter into the equation by increasing the costs of migration. The 
variable used to capture the costs of migration is the distance between the host country and the source country which 
assumes these costs are fixed and same for all individuals from a given source country. Note, however, that these 
“additional costs” due to selection by the host country will be different among individuals of a given source country   
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the importance of rationing of visas by the source country in determining the resulting selectivity 
of immigrants.  
The next section outlines the theoretical model and estimation issues. Section 3 describes 




This paper estimates a structural model of international migration based on the 
framework developed by Aydemir (2003). In this model migration is specified as a two step 
process: 
Step (1): Application: Potential migrants apply to migrate to a host country. 
Step (2): Review: The host country chooses migrants from the applicant pool. 
The two decision makers, the individual and the host country, determine the outcome of 
international migration. The individual makes a decision on whether to apply or not, and the host 
country decides whether to accept a given application or reject it. 
The individual i located in the source country (country 2) and considering migration to 
the host country (country 1) will apply if the expected gain from application exceeds the 
application cost,  ai C :  
a
i P ( i w1 - mi C ) + (1- 
a
i P ) i w2 -  i w2 >  ai C                     (1) 
where  i w1  and  i w2  are the present value of life time earnings in the host and the source countries, 
a
i P  is the probability that application will be accepted and  mi C  is the moving costs. The expected 
income if the individual applies  is given by
a
i P ( i w1 - mi C ) + (1- 
a
i P ) i w2  whereas the expected 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and will lead to the selection among individuals. As Borjas focuses on unobserved quality differences across   
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income if the individual does not apply is simply,  i w2  and the difference between the two give 
the expected gain of application.  
If 0 = ai C , the criterion reduces to: 
      ( i w1 -  i w2  -  mi C ) > 0      (2) 
for non-zero 
a
i P . The cost of application  ai C , is incurred at the time of the application. This is a 
variable cost depending on the number of dependents and does not include costs of moving, 
foregone earnings etc. which are included in  mi C .  ai C  is generally small relative to the lifetime 
w's and is assumed to equal zero in the rest of the analysis.
4 
Following the previous literature, let
5,
6 
mi C =  mi c i w2  
where  mi c 0 ≥ and using the approximation  c c ≈ + ) 1 ln(  (for small values of c), the equivalent 
criterion for applying becomes: 
12 ln ln ii m i ww c −− > 0                    (3) 
Let the present value of log lifetime earnings in the two countries be represented by the 
following linear functions: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
countries, he ignores this important selection issue among individuals within a given source country.  
4  The assumption of  ai C = 0 rules out any effect of review by host country on application decision. Relaxation of 
this independence assumption can only be done with more information on costs and changes in the model, and is left 
for future research. 
 
5  Robinson and Tomes (1980) give theoretical and empirical justification for this assumption. One justification is 
that the cost of migration is proportional to the source country permanent income due to the existence of source 
country specific investment and/or endowments. The linear specification  mi C =  mi c i w2  follows from the 
convenience of functional form. Note that the factor of proportionality  mi c  is indexed by i allowing the costs to vary 
across individuals. 
 
6 Note that with the assumption that migration costs are proportional  i w2  it is implicitly assumed that there are no 
direct (or out of pocket) costs. These costs, such as the cost of an airfare, are likely to be very small in the Canada-
US context being studied here. Under no direct cost assumption, Chiswick (1999, 2000) shows the Roy model to be 
a special case of the human capital model.   
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i i i X w 1 1 1 1 ln ε β + =           (4.1) 
   i i i X w 2 2 2 2 ln ε β + =    (4.2)  
And let 
i i mi X c 3 3 3 ε β + =        (5) 
where the X's are observable and the ε 's are unobservable to the econometrician. The β  
coefficients represent the structural parameters of interest in the application step. 
Next, define the following index: 
i i i i i i i i i W X X X I ε π ε β ε β ε β + ≡ − − − − + = 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
*  (6) 
so that the criterion for step (1) is 
*
1i I > 0, or i ε >  i Wπ − . The coefficients π represent the reduced 
form parameters of interest in the application step. 
The other decision maker, i.e. the host country, accepts an application if  
*
2 44 4 i ii IX β ε =+ > 0                            (7) 
where  i X 4  are observable characteristics of the potential immigrant and any measurable policy 
parameters and  i 4 ε  are unobservables to the econometrician. In Canada immigrants other than 
those accepted under family class or due to humanitarian reasons (refugee class) are subject to a 
points test. In the point system several characteristics are assessed and given points according to 
a schedule, and admission depends on having sufficient number of points over the pass mark.
7 A 
subjective assessment by the immigration officer and unobserved factors such as a health 
problem that may cause rejection contributes to the error component.  
 
 
                                                           
7 Appendix A provides further information about the Canadian Immigration Policy and the point system as of 1986-
1990 period.   
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  2.1 Estimation of the Parameters of the Two-Step Model 
Estimation of the parameters from the reduced form index π and  4 β  is called reduced 
form estimation of the 2-step model. Estimation of the parameters of the application step  2 1,β β  
and 3 β , along with  4 β  is referred to as "structural estimation". The aim of the structural 
estimation is to obtain consistent estimates of  2 1,β β  that will be used to get consistent estimates 
of  1 ln i w  and 2 ln i w . Given the consistent predictors for  1 ln i w  and  2 ln i w , these may be used in the 
structural index: 
*^ ^
1 11 22 33 () ( ) i ii i i IX X X β ββ ε =−− −  
The probability of applying for migration for an individual is then given by: 
^^
11 22 33 Pr ( ) ( ) /
i






 −−  

>        (8) 
On the other hand the probability that an individual i will be accepted (i.e. 
*
2i I >0) is given by: 
{ } 44 4 Pr ii X βε + >0                   (9) 
Since we only observe whether an individual is a migrant or not, but don’t observe the 
application step or application review step by the host country, the parameters of the reduced 
form (π and 4 β ) or the structural parameters ( 2 1,β β  and 3 β , along with 4 β ) can not be estimated 
by two separate probit models for (8) and (9) above. For example, in the data those who applied 
but were turned down are not known. The only information available is who actually migrated 
(that is who applied and was admitted) and who did not which leads to the partial observability 
framework of Poirier (1980). The model parameters can be obtained by estimating the following 
bivariate probit model: 
n i I I Z i i i ,..., 2 , 1 * 2 1 = =    
  
   
 10 
1 i Z =  if individual i is observed as a migrant; 0 otherwise. Thus  i Z  is the observed migration 
variable and the probability of migration is the joint probability: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 Pr 1 Pr 1 1 Pr 1 , 1 Pr 1 1 2 2 1 = = = = = = = = i i i i i i Z I I I I I  
The probability distribution of Z  is given by: 
() ( )
() ( ) ( )
m
i i i i i i
m
i i i i
P I and I I or I Z
P I and I Z
− = = = − = = = = =
≡ = = = =
1 1 1 Pr 1 0 0 Pr 0 Pr
1 1 Pr 1 Pr
2 1 2 1
2 1  
Given a random sample of observations onZ , the log likelihood for the sample can be specified 
given distributional assumptions on theε 's. Assume that each individual in the source country 
draws a realization of the pair () 4 ,ε ε  from the bivariate normal distribution  () ρ ε ε , , 4 g , where ρ  
is the correlation between ε  and  4 ε . For reduced form parameters of interest, given a random 
sample of observations () () n i X W Z i i i ,..., 2 , 1 , 4 = ,  the log likelihood is given by:  
( ) () ( ) () {} 44 4 4 4
1
, , ln , ; 1 ln 1 , ; (10)
n
mn m
ii i i i i i i
i
LZ a G W X Z a G W X πβ ρ π β ρ π β ρ
=
=+ − −   ∑  
Letting  []
'
4 , ' , ' ρ β π θ = , the parameter vector θ  is to be estimated. 
Under the usual identification conditions (e.g. for the reduced form parameters π  and 4 β , 
one of the vectors  ) ( 4i i X or W  excludes at least one exogenous variable appearing in the other 
vector) and subject to a normalization rule in each equation, the parameters are identified 
(Heckman, 1976, 1978; Amemiya, 1978).
8,
9 
                                                           
8 Choice-based sampling is relevant in this study for the subpopulations of those who migrate and those who do not. 
The model is estimated along the method of Manski and Lerman (1977) by using the appropriate weights for choice-
based sampling. The weight for a migrant ( )
m
i a  is equal to the fraction of migrants in a certain group (such as 
males, aged 18 to 65) in source country population over the fraction of migrants in the sample (with previous 
restrictions) used for estimation. The weight for a non-migrant ( )
nm
i a  is calculated similarly. The data provide the 
number of migrants from a source country over a period of time. Given the size of the source country population the 
weights can be calculated. 
9  Choice-based sampling also requires a correction for the standard errors. The correct standard errors for the 
choice-based sampling are calculated and reported later in the text with the parameter estimates.   
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A 3-stage estimation procedure is used to obtain consistent estimates of structural 
parameters. This method is an extension of the Heckman 2-stage method for sample selectivity. 
The three stage estimation procedure includes first, the estimation of the reduced form 2-step 
model that yields estimates of (π and 4 β ).  
Second stage involves getting the consistent parameter estimates of the earnings 
equations to construct the earnings differentials { }
^^
11 22 () ( ) ii XX β β − . The earnings functions 
cannot be estimated for all individuals originally resident in the source country. For the migrants 
we observe  i w1 ln  and for the stayers we observe  i w2 ln . Estimation of the earnings equations 
requires taking into account the double selection process. Equation (4.1) is estimated on the 
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Equation (4.2), on the other hand, must be estimated on the sample of stayers: 
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Estimation of earnings equation for source country using the sample of stayers is then given by 
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Using the parameter estimates from the reduced form two-step model the sample selection terms 
in the two earnings equations (11.1) and (11.2) are constructed. Estimation of (11.1) and (11.2) 
provides consistent parameter estimates of  1 β and  2 β  in (11.1) and (11.2) which are then used to 
construct the predicted earnings differentials.  
Finally in the last stage of estimation, using these predicted earnings differentials and 










11 22 3 3 44
ln 1/ ( ) ( ) , , ;
,,
1l n 1 1 / ( ) ( ) , , ;
m
n ii i i i
nm
i
ii i i i
Za G X X X X
L
Za G X X X X
ε
ε
σβ ββ β ρ
πβ ρ
σβ ββ β ρ =
  −+   = 
  −− −    
∑        (11.3) 
Note that the probability of observing an individual as a migrant is given by 
()
^^
11 22 33 44 4 44 4 Pr ( ) ( ) / *Pr
i
ii i i i i i XXX X X ε
ε
ε
β ββ σ β ε β ε
σ

 −− − −  

>> >         
The coefficient on the predicted earnings differential { }
^^
11 22 () ( ) ii XX β β − is given by 1/ 0 ε σ > . 
This restriction may be tested by estimating the bivariate probit (11.3).  
The earnings equation (11.1) is estimated for migrants while (11.2) is estimated using a 
sample of non-migrants. Using the reduced form parameter estimates, sample selectivity terms 
4
i
j λ  for migrants, and 
*
j λ  for non-migrants are calculated for inclusion in the wage generating 
functions. The coefficients obtained on  4
i
j λ  and 
*
j λ  provide information on whether there is 
positive or negative selection in migrant or non-migrant categories. For ( 1,2 j = ), coefficients on 
4
i
j λ  indicate whether a migrant would earn in the host country, other things being equal, more 
than the average taken over both migrant and non-migrants. Similarly, the coefficients on 
*
j λ  for   
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1, 2 j =  is interpreted as whether the non-migrants would earn more in the source country, other 
things being equal, than the average taken over both migrants and non-migrants.  
 
2.2  Empirical Specifications of the Equations 
The earnings functions are specified as semi-logs proposed by Mincer (1974): 
ji j ji ji X w ε β + = ln                  
where 
= ji X {schooling, degree, experience, language, training} i 
and higher order terms in experience. The language variable is in general important in 
immigration context. In this study, however, where migration form the U.S. to Canada is 
concerned all individuals in the data report being either native English speakers or speak English 
very well. Therefore language variable is omitted. Also, lack of information on training in the 
data sets leads to omission of this variable. 
The variables  i 1 ε  and  i 2 ε  include general unobserved ability and unobserved country 
specific capital. It is assumed that, over the entire population of individuals initially located in 
the source country,  i 1 ε  and  i 2 ε  have zero means, variances  11 σ ,  22 σ  and covariance  21 σ . No 
restrictions are imposed on the sign of  21 σ . The parameters  1 β  and  2 β  are not constrained to be 
equal, allowing rates of return for each characteristic to vary by country. For example, the 
location where the highest degree and training are completed can be important in the 
immigration context. 
 The factor of proportionality  mi c  is given by:  i i mi X c 3 3 3 ε β + =  where   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
10 There is a technical appendix for the details of this three stage procedure and the earnings equations (11.1) and 
(11.2) available from the author upon request. The framework for earnings equations follows and extends Tunali 
(1986).   
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i X 3 ={family size, language, marital status, schooling} i 
           i 3 ε ={unobservable cost components} i            
i 3 ε  is assumed to have zero mean, variance  33 σ  and covariances  23 σ ,  13 σ . It is argued that the 
presence of children, due to changing schools, etc., inhibits migration. Also, there is empirical 
evidence that the existence of a spouse increases costs of migration (Mincer, 1978). Schooling 
and language are hypothesized to reduce the information costs via better information and job 
prospects and lower the cost of moving. Again in the U.S.-Canada context the language variable 
is dropped. 
Given the above specifications of  i i i X X X 3 2 1 , ,  and after replacing experience with age, 
in the reduced form estimation  i W  in (6) is given by: 
i W ={schooling, degree, age, family size, marital status} i 
The vector  4i X  in the second selection index is given by: 
i X 4 ={schooling, age, occupation, degree} i 
i 4 ε ={unobservable components affecting admission} i 
These variables in  i X 4  are the characteristics evaluated in the point system. More educated 
individuals get higher points. In general, applicants in white-collar occupations (Executive and 
Administrative, Professional Specialty, Teaching and Related Occupations) are awarded higher 
points compared to those in sales and blue collar occupations. Younger applicants get higher 
points under the age factor, whereas those more experienced are awarded higher points under the 
experience factor.
11  Also, those who have arranged employment are more likely to be admitted 
as they are awarded extra points. It is assumed that the probability of having arranged 
                                                           
11 An identification problem arises if experience, age and schooling are entered simultaneously since experience is 
calculated as (age - years of schooling – 6).   
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employment depends on occupation, experience and degree. Unobservable components affecting 
admission includes the points under the ‘personal suitability' factor which is determined by the 
immigration officer at an interview. Also, other factors such as a medical condition preventing 
admission of an applicant or the factors that affect arranged employment that can not be captured 
by the characteristics in 4 X , such as motivation, contribute to the error term. The mean of the 
personal suitability points is captured in the intercept term and the remaining error component is 
assumed to have zero mean and constant variance over the population of the source country.
12 
 
3     Data 
Immigrant sample used in the estimation is obtained by matching the Landings Records 
(LIDS) with the Immigration Database (IMDB). 
LIDS data contains demographic data (e.g. age, marital status, last permanent residence), 
program data (immigrant category, special program codes, principal applicant code) and personal 
characteristics (intended occupation, years of schooling, level of education, self-assessed 
knowledge of an official language). These data are recorded as of the date of issue of the landing 
visa and are available for all landings in Canada. Longitudinal IMDB data matches the landings 
records with the earnings information in tax files providing several observations on earnings of 
an immigrant.
13 
                                                           
12 Above specification assumes that the selection index  i I 2
*  is that  4 ε  is not correlated with  4 X . Potentially a non-
zero correlation between  4 ε  and  4 X may exist if the migration officers decision for points under "personal 
suitability" depends on the points obtained from other factors. Using the distribution of point scores, the correlation 
between  4 ε  and individual components of  4 X  as well as the total number of points obtained from  4 X  are 
investigated and no significant correlation is found. 
 
13 To be included in the IMDB a migrant has to file at least one tax return starting from the date of application. A 
study done by Carpentier and Pinsonneault (1994) finds that the IMDB is representative of the tax-filing population. 
Average characteristics in the IMDB resemble those generally found in the labour force. 
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  This study also uses a sample from the Immigration Data System Overseas (IDSO) 
which provides the points awarded to principal applicants for each characteristic assessed under 
the point system. IDSO also provides other administrative information such as the date the 
application was received, and the date of landing. The information in IDSO is used for testing the 
assumptions regarding the error term  4 ε as discussed in the previous section. 
The distinguishing features of the data on migrants are the inclusion of immigrant 
class/category, the special program codes and the principal applicant codes. Information on 
immigrant class (e.g. refugee class, independent class etc.) determines the selection criteria that 
apply to an immigrant. Principal applicant information indicates which immigrants are assessed 
and which are dependents. Special program codes indicate cases admitted under relaxed criteria. 
These variables, which does not exist in other data sources used for studying immigration such as 
the Census, are crucial in determining which individuals goes through the points test. This 
additional information allows for a detailed and more careful analysis of the immigration policy 
and labour force outcomes of immigrants.  
The sample of immigrants consists of male immigrants aged 18-65 who applied and were 
accepted from the U.S. between 1986 and 1990. There were several changes in the point system 
between 1980 and 1990. Over the period of 1986 to 1990 the selection criteria did not change for 
the independent class allowing the study of migrants admitted under a constant policy regime. 
The migrant samples are further restricted to skilled workers admitted under the independent 
class, who are principal applicants. These are individuals who are seeking admission on the basis 
of their labour market skills by going through the points test.
14 Immigrants whose intended 
                                                           
14 Immigrants can enter Canada under Family or Assisted Relative classes or the Refugee class. While illegal 
immigration is an important issue for other countries e.g. the U.S., illegal immigration and refugee migration is not 
an important issue between Canada and the U.S. Although the decision of individuals under which immigrant class 
to apply is interesting, it is beyond the scope of this paper. Also note that, as Chiswick (1999, 2000) argues the   
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destination is Quebec are excluded since the province of Quebec has its own selection criteria 
different from the rest of Canada. Immigrants who are admitted under special programs or those 
that pass the point test only with the immigration officer's discretion are also excluded
15. The 
resulting migrant sample from the U.S. consists of 2,500 records. 
 The non-migrant sample is a 1/60 random sample from the 1/100 U.S. Census restricted 
to males aged 18 to 65, in civilian labour force and not in school at the time of the census. This 
sample refers to non-migrants, that is individuals who didn't apply or who applied but were 
rejected for immigration to Canada. The resulting non-migrant sample from the U.S. consists of 
10305 records. Pooling sample of migrant and non-migrants consist of 12,805 records. 
 lnWAGE obtained from the 1990 US Census includes wages and salaries and income 
from self-employment and the figures are first converted to 1990 constant US dollars and then to 
1990 Canadian dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) index
16. Given the cross-sectional 
nature of the data, it contains only one observation on the age-earnings or experience-earnings 
profile of each individual. Given this restriction, the model characterizes an individual’s profile 
in the source country by using a single variable (permanent income) as described above. One 
could also compute the lifetime earnings of an individual using the lifetime-wage profile implied 
by the cross-sectional data. However, given the likely presence of cohort effects this can lead to a 
biased estimate of life-time earnings.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
favorable selection is expected to be strongest among individuals migrating under skilled class relative to other 
immigrants e.g. refugees who are primarily moving for non-economic reasons.  
15 Independent class applicants may be accepted even if they don't have enough points, by way of the immigration 
officer's discretionary power. This discretion, which is exercised very rarely, is different from the immigration 
officer's regular evaluation for personal suitability. An example of a special program would be accepting immigrants 
from a country that had a natural disaster. For the admission of these migrants some or all of the characteristics in 
4 X  may be irrelevant, and these migrants are excluded from the sample as well. 
16 CPI figures are obtained from: Consumer Price Indexes, Sixteen Countries, 1950-1998, US Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Technology, June 8, 1999 
PPP figures are obtained form: Cansim Purchasing Power Parity, System of National Accounts Classification, 
Expenditure Based, Statistics Canada   
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The same definition is used for the lnWAGE for earnings observations of immigrants 
from the IMDB as in the US data. IMDB provides multiple observations on earnings for a given 
individual. For example, an immigrant who arrived in 1986 may have up to nine observations on 
earnings for years 1987 to 1995
17. All earnings figures are expressed in 1990 constant Canadian 
dollars using the CPI index. Using each tax year as a cross-section and pooling the earnings data 
over 1987 to 1995, the wage function (11.1) is estimated. Having more than one observation for 
a given individual provides better estimates of host country earnings equation as recent 
immigrants are expected to earn less than earlier immigrants with the same characteristics.  
Tables 1 give the definitions of variables while Tables 2 presents the descriptive statistics 
for migrants and non-migrants. Table 2 reveals that migrants are composed of younger, more 
educated individuals concentrated in white-collar occupations that are more likely to be married 
relative to non-migrants.  
4 Estimation  Results 
4.1  Results from the Reduced Form Estimation 
Table 3 presents the results from the estimation of the reduced form 2-step model of 
migration. The coefficients in the first selection index refers to reduced form coefficients π in 
equation (6) indicating the total effect of the exogenous variables on the probability of applying, 
acting through the wage differential for migrating versus staying and through the cost of moving. 
The coefficients of the second selection index refer to  4 β in (7) and give the effect of exogenous 
variables on the probability of acceptance. 
The important result that emerges from table 3 is that individuals with higher education 
are less likely to apply while they are more likely to be accepted through the point system. This 
                                                           
17 Earnings data for those whose year of arrival is the same as the tax year is not used in the estimation since they   
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result shows that individuals in the U.S. are negatively self-selected at the application stage in 
terms of observable characteristics. However, there is a positive selection at the review step by 
the host country among those who apply. The importance of taking into account the selection by 
the host country is illustrated by Aydemir (2003) which estimates the reduced form 2-step model 
presented here as well as a reduced form model that ignores the selection by the host country. 
When estimation is done for two source countries, the U.S. and U.K., the results from the 
reduced form model that ignores the selection by the host country shows that more educated 
individuals are more likely to be observed as immigrants. The pervious literature ignoring the 
selection by the host country would interpret these results as evidence of positive self-selection 
where more educated have more incentives to migrate and hence more willing to become 
immigrants. When reduced form 2-step model is estimated, however, the results show that while 
more educated individuals from UK have more incentives to migrate, the reverse is true for 
individuals in the US.  
Other results in table 3 referring to first selection index show that having more 
dependents decreases the probability of application for migration through increasing costs of 
migration, increasing age initially increases the probability of applying for migration, later 
decreases this probability. Results from the second selection index are in general consistent with 
the structure of the point system where older individuals are less likely to be accepted, whereas 
those in white collar occupations who get higher points under occupation factors are more likely 
to be admitted. Hence, the results for education variable suggest negative self-selection at the 
application stage and positive selection at the review step by the host country. These results from 
the reduced form 2-step model are used to construct the sample selectivity terms to get consistent 
parameter estimates in (11.1) and (11.2) and results are presented in the next section. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
may not have spent a full year in the country after their arrival.   
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4.2  Results from the Estimation of the Wage Equations 
The results of the estimation of the earnings equations for the host country and the source 
country are presented in tables 4 and 5. Schooling and experience have the expected signs in 
both equations with the source country (US) returns to these characteristics being larger than the 
returns in the host country (Canada). Since the earnings equation results will be used to predict 
the counterfactual earnings (e.g. results from the estimation of the host country earnings equation 
will be used to predict earnings of non-migrants in Canada had they migrated) certain variables 
such as region of residence are not included in the regression. If such a variable was included we 
would have to know the region of residence in Canada a non-migrant would be in had that 
individual migrated. Instead, the simple specification allows us to average over regions in this 
example, thus enabling us to predict the counter factual earnings of a non-migrant. 
Of particular interest here are the estimates of the sample selection terms in the two 
equations. At least one sample selectivity term is significant in each of the two earnings 
equations. Since  41 0 λ > and 42 0 λ > , the negative coefficient estimated for  41 λ  implies a negative 
selection into the migrant group in terms of unobserved characteristics. The coefficient of  42 λ , 
on the other hand, is insignificant and close to zero in magnitude. These imply that, immigrants’ 
earnings in Canada are less, ceteris paribus, than what the earnings of non-migrants would have 
been in Canada had they migrated. That is, if host country is trying to select individuals with 
higher motivation, adaptability etc. under personal suitability factor, these individuals are less 
likely to apply for migration. These results and the previous ones related to schooling imply a 
negative self-selection at the application stage in terms of both observed and unobserved 
characteristics. For the source country earnings equation the coefficient estimates for the sample 
selectivity terms are negative. Given that 
*
1 0 λ < and 
*
2 0 λ < these coefficient estimates suggest a   
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positive selection among the non-migrants. That is, non-migrants earn more, ceteris paribus, than 
what the migrants in the source would earn had they not migrated to the host country.  
In tables 4 and 5 the parameter estimate related to  41 λ is much larger than that for 42 λ , and 
the parameter estimate related to
*
1 λ  is much larger than that for
*
2 λ . The larger coefficients for 
41 λ and
*
1 λ correspond to the self-selection among the individuals at the application stage whereas 
the other two refer to the selection by the host country during the review process. This result 
shows that selectivity in terms of unobserved skills among the migrants is mostly due to the self-
selection that occurs at the application stage which corresponds to the individuals’ assessment of 
returns to the migration. While the host country has effective means of selecting individuals in 
terms of easily observed characteristics, such as education, it is much harder to select individuals 
based on other characteristics such as motivation. 
The results presented here are also consistent with the Roy model. Given that the U.S. 
income distribution has higher income inequality than Canada and earnings between the two 
countries are positively and strongly correlated, the Roy model would predict that unobserved 
skills of applicants for migration from US to Canada will be below-average. The results 
suggesting a negative selection among applicants and a positive selection among non-migrants 
provide evidence supporting the predictions of the Roy model. 
Using the parameter estimates of the earnings equations, earnings in the U.S. can be 
predicted for both immigrants and non-migrants. Figure 1 presents the distribution of predicted 
earnings in the U.S. for the migrants and figure 2 presents the same for non-migrants. This shows 
from which part of the U.S. income distribution the immigrants are coming. Comparing the two 
figures it becomes evident that almost half of the immigrants are coming from the upper end of 
the US income distribution corresponding to 90
th percentile or higher. While the previous 
discussions showed that immigrants are negatively self-selected in terms of observed and   
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unobserved characteristics, the review step by the host country tries to select those with higher 
observed and unobserved skills. The relative position of immigrants in the U.S. income 
distribution shows that self-selection of immigrants and their selection by the host country may 
move in the opposite directions. As in the case of observed characteristics the selection by the 
host country may outweigh the first one. This may be due to availability of effective policy 
instruments such as the points system used in the Canadian context for selecting immigrants. For 
unobserved characteristics, however, a positive selection is much harder to achieve by the host 
country. The results suggest that review step can not overturn the negative self-selection 
occurring at the application stage in terms of unobserved skills.  
 
4.3     Results from the Structural Bivariate Probit Model 
Estimation of the structural bivariate probit model given by (11.3) is carried out as 
outlined above. The model discussed in section 2 states that individuals will apply for migration 
if permanent income in the host country is greater than that in the source country net of moving 
costs. The use of predicted earnings differentials { }
^^
11 22 () ( ) ii XX β β − as a measure of permanent 
income differential between two countries deserves some comment. Ideally present value of life 
time earnings would be calculated for any given individual in both the source and host countries. 
However, this would require a much richer data than what is used in this study. For example, for 
the immigrants the data provides up to eight observations for a given individual and estimating 
life time earnings would necessarily require an assumption of no cohort effects and in some 
cases predictions out of the sample. Using estimated earnings differential has its problems as 
well. It is well known that immigrant may experience an assimilation process with low earnings 
in first few years after migration and higher earnings in later years. Therefore, at certain points of   
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the age-earnings or experience-earnings profiles although individuals may not have big gains or 
even realize some losses, this may be compensated in the years ahead as years of residence in the 
host country increases. Using the predicted earnings differentials { }
^^
11 22 () ( ) ii XX β β − for a given 
individual at the given level of experience and schooling in the data gives the difference between 
the experience-earnings profiles between the two countries at a single point. The coefficient 
estimate on this differential then tests whether individuals become more likely to apply for 
migration as this differential increases, providing evidence on the hypothesis that individuals 
choose to live in countries that provide higher permanent incomes. An alternative approach is 
adopted by Robinson and Tomes (1980) who partition their sample according to the experience 
and estimate their model for each experience interval. Then, the expectation is that the 
predictions of the model will be observed for at least one experience group. Given the small 
sample size of migrants in my data I am prohibited from adopting this approach. In the 
estimation of earnings differentials marital status is also taken as a permanent characteristic 
while individuals may change their marital status. Another important issue is that tax rates on a 
given level of income are different across the two countries. However, taking into account the 
tax rates also requires an assessment of the differences in the provision of public goods in the 
two countries. While in general taxes are higher in Canada, some goods such as health care, 
education are mostly provided by the government. The lower cost of such goods will be assumed 
to compensate for higher taxes.  
In estimation of the structural probit, following Robinson and Tomes (1980), age and its 
square is included as a partial control for the fact that wage gain is estimated at a point in the life 
cycle rather than using the difference in permanent income streams. The moving costs 
i i mi X c 3 3 3 ε β + =  has the same specification as discussed before where     
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i X 3 ={family size, marital status, schooling} i 
While  mi c  includes family size that increases moving costs due to change of schools for kids etc., 
it doesn’t appear in the earnings equation. Similarly experience is assumed to affect migration 
through its effect on wages, however, it doesn’t affect moving costs. These exclusion restrictions 
allow identification of parameters in structural index 1 I . Table 6 presents the results from the 
estimation of the structural model. The standard errors are subject to a downward bias since 
estimates of the wage differences rather than the true (unknown) values are being used. In a 
similar setting Robinson and Tomes (1980) report the likely magnitude of this bias in a modified 
version of their model to be 25 per cent. The discussions below are subject to this caveat. 
The important result from estimation of the structural model in table 6 is the coefficient 
for the earnings differential which is positive and significant. Subject to the caveat concerning 
significance this provides evidence in favor of the model
18. This result becomes more impressive 
when viewed taking into account the fact that the model is tested for all experience groups 
combined together and also against various data issues arising from use of data from two 
different countries. Although much of the immigration literature studying international migration 
relies on the hypothesis that individuals respond to the earnings differentials across countries, to 
my knowledge, this result provides the first direct evidence supporting this hypothesis. 
Other results in the first and second selection index are similar to the reduced form 
results. In the first selection index that refers to the application stage age variables are significant 
suggesting that marginal propensity to migrate decreases with age. A difference from the reduced 
form results is the positive and significant coefficient on years of schooling. Controlling for the 
earnings differential higher education increases mobility which may be due to better information 
                                                           
18 Even if the correct standard error was twice the size of the reported standard error in the table, the estimated 
coefficient for the earnings differential would still be significant at the 1 % level.   
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or reduced costs of moving. Family size, which enters with a negative coefficient, is an important 
deterrent to migration whereas married variable enters with a positive coefficient increasing 
mobility. Single individuals who may have stronger connections to their families (e.g. because of 
living with parents) may be more tied stayers than married people. In the second selection index 
that refers to the probability of acceptance, results similar to the reduced form specification are 
obtained. Higher education and being in a white collar or professional occupation increase the 
probability of acceptance while increasing age decreases this probability consistent with the 
structure of the point system.  
 
5       Conclusions 
This paper specified and estimated a structural model of international migration using 
micro data. This provides a direct test of human capital theory that suggests that individuals 
respond to the earnings differentials across countries while making their migration decisions. 
The model also recognizes that there are two decision makers affecting the outcome of 
international migration, i.e. the individual and the host country. Existing studies of international 
migration abstract from this and estimate the outcome of migration without being able to 
separately identify the factors determining the decision of these two players. 
 The model proposed by Borjas(1987) based on Roy has predictions for the selection of 
observed and unobserved characteristics. It is harder to test the predictions of this model for the 
unobserved characteristics and there are no direct tests available in the literature. The indirect 
tests employed in the literature by Borjas and other researchers provided mixed evidence and 
also stirred a lot of discussion on whether there is favorable selection amongst immigrants. The 
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framework of this paper which also takes into account the selection by the host country provides 
the first direct evidence on the issue.  
The empirical results in this paper support the human capital model with the evidence 
showing that wage differentials between the host and the source country affect the migration 
decision in the predicted direction. The estimates of life time earnings could be improved by 
using panel data for both migrants and non-migrants and taking into account individual 
heterogeneity. While incorporating these refinements is important in this setting, the Census data 
used for non-migrants doesn’t allow pursuing this avenue. The results also show that both the 
host country and the individual each have significant impact on the outcome of international 
migration. As shown by the reduced form results, while schooling increase the probability of 
acceptance by the host country it decreases the probability of application due to the higher 
returns to education in US. Finally, estimated wage equations and predicted earnings of 
immigrants in the source country provide evidence on selection issues. The results suggest a 
negative self-selection at the application stage both in terms of observed and unobserved 
characteristics which is consistent with the predictions of the Roy model. However, when the 
predicted earnings of immigrants in the source country is compared to the predicted earnings of 
non-migrants it is shown that they come from the upper end of the income distribution. This 
result is due to positive selection that occurs at the review step by the host country which shows 
the importance of rationing of visas by the source country in determining the resulting selectivity 
of immigrants.    
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Appendix A - Immigration Policy of Canada  
Canada admits immigrants under four main categories: 1) Independent, 2) The refugee 
and humanitarian class, 3) "Sponsored" dependents (husband, wife, fiancée, generally close 
relatives),  4) "Nominated relative" (apply likewise to close relatives). 
"Nominated relatives" and "Independent applicants" constituted about 50% of the total 
number of migrants admitted in 1990 with over half of them being migrants under Independent 
Class. The applications under "independent" and the "nominated relative" classes are subject to 
the point system where the pass mark was 70 points over the period we study. 
The following table outlines the point system that was effective over 1986-1990: 
Point System 1986-1990 
Category  Potential Points 
Education 12 
Special Vocational Preparation  15 
Experience 8 
Occupational Demand  10 
Arranged Employment/Designated Occ.  10 
Age 10 
Knowledge of French and English  15 
Personal Suitability  10 




The number of points to be awarded for each factor in the point system, except the personal 
suitability, is determined according to a schedule. Occupations are listed in 7-digit detail with 
each occupation on the list assigned a maximum of 10 points based on the deemed demand for 
that occupation in the Canadian labour market. Specific vocational preparation (SVP) points 
                                                           
19 With the demographic factor set at 5, the maximum points possible from the characteristics listed is equal to 95. If 
the immigration officer decides to use his discretionary power he can award up to 10 points. This is different than 
the personal suitability. Use of discretion is very rare and nobody in our sample passed with discretion.   
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depend on the amount of formal training required for average performance in that occupation. 
Applicants with higher levels of education and experience get higher points in each of these 
categories, while the number of points for age category goes down with increasing age. Those 
who have a job offer validated by Human Resources and Development Canada get extra 10 
points. Ability to read, write and speak in the two official languages determines the number of 
points under the language factor. Demographic factor (or levels), on the other hand, is set at 5 for 
everyone over the period we study. By setting different levels it is aimed to control the number 
of people entering over a period. 
The only subjective factor in the point system is the personal suitability, for which a 
maximum of ten points is available. The visa officer will make arrangements for an interview 
with the applicant where he considers the latter could meet the selection criteria, based on the 
information provided and the points the applicant could be awarded for personal suitability. 
According to the immigration manual determination of the number of units of assessment to be 
awarded to an applicant rests on the judgment of the interviewing officer. The qualities of 
adaptability, motivation, initiative, resourcefulness, and such other attributes admirable or 
otherwise, as the applicant may display, are characteristics on which the officer may base his 
determination   
  





Notes for Table 1: 
Number of dependents is calculated as follows: 
•  Migrants: number of potential visas to be issued to a principal applicant and the dependents excluding the 
principal applicant and the spouse. Visas are issued to spouse, children who are never married under the age 18, 
or children over 18 who are dependent on their parents due to for example a long-term illness. 
•  Non-migrants: number of persons in the family excluding the parents. 
 
Table 1  
Definitions of Variables  
 




1: if application for migration received between 1986-1990 
 
migr 
  And accepted; 0 otherwise   
Schooling  Years of schooling completed  nyrssch   
  (Years of schooling completed)/10  yrssch   
Age  (Age)/10 and its square  age 
   agesq 
Experience  Labour market experience= (Age-Yrssch-6); and its square  exp 
   expsq 
    
Marital Status  Married: 1: if married or common law; 0: otherwise (Reference group is 
single-never married, widow or separated) 
married 
Dependents  Dep1: 1:if number of dependents is equal to 1; 0: otherwise  dep1 
  Dep2: 1:if number of dependents is equal to 2; 0: otherwise  dep2 
  Dep3: 1:if number of dependents is equal to 3; 0: otherwise  dep3 
  Depg3: 1:if number of dependents is greater than 3; 0: otherwise  depg3 
  (Reference group is those with no dependents – see notes below for 
details) 
 
Occupation  Exec: 1: if executive, administrative or managerial occup.; 0: otherwise  exec 
  Prof: 1: if professional specialty occup.; 0: otherwise  prof 
  Techn: 1: if technicians and related occup.; 0: otherwise  techn 
  Sales: 1: if sales occup.; 0: otherwise  sales 
  Service: 1: if service occup.; 0: otherwise  service 
  Farm: 1: if farming, forestry, and fishing occup.; 0: otherwise  farm 
  (Reference group is other blue-collar occupations)     
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics  
 
 Migrants  Non-Migrants 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
age 3.79 0.81 4.02  1.25 
yrssch 1.77  0.33  1.30  0.29 
dep1 0.15  0.36 0.21 0.40 
dep2 0.20  0.40 0.23 0.42 
dep3 0.08  0.27 0.10 0.30 
depg3 0.01  0.10  0.08 0.27 
married 0.74  0.43  0.66  0.47 
exec 0.35  0.47 0.18 0.38 
prof 0.54 0.49 0.10  0.30 
farm 0.004  0.06 0.040 0.19 
sales 0.014  0.11 0.151 0.35 
service 0.010  0.09  0.078  0.26 
techn 0.018  0.13  0.034 0.18 
N 2,500  10,305 
Note: For dummy variables, mean values reported correspond to the 











   
  






Reduced Form Two-Step Model  
 
   Coefficient  Std.  Error 
constant -3.28  (0.36) 
age 3.16  (0.21) 
agesq -0.37  (0.02) 
yrssch -0.41  (0.15) 
dep1 -1.03  (0.08) 
dep2 -1.11  (0.08) 
dep3 -1.07  (0.09) 




First Selection Index 
(Application 
Decision) 
married 0.58  (0.05) 
   Coefficient  Std.  Error 
constant -4.94  (0.07) 
age -0.15  (0.01) 
yrssch 1.06  (0.03) 
exec 0.36  (0.01) 
prof 0.34  (0.01) 
techn -0.004  (0.02) 
sales -0.26  (0.02) 









 farm  -0.06  (0.04) 
  rho( 4 ,ε ε )  -0.56 (0.01) 
 N  12,805 
Note: Estimation results from a bivariate probit model with partial observability: 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
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Table 4 
Coefficient Estimates  - Host Country Earnings Equation 




     Variable       Coefficient          Std. Error
    constant  9.031 (.096) 
   nYrssch  0.051 (.004) 
  exp  0.048 (.005) 
   expsq  -0.0008 (.0001) 
  married  0.319 (.024) 
   41 λ   -0.129 (.026) 











Coefficient Estimates  - Source Country Earnings Equation 




     Variable       Coefficient          Std. Error
    constant  7.953 (.023) 
   nYrssch  0.098 (.017) 
  exp  0.067 (.001) 
   expsq  -0.001 (.00002) 
  married  0.386 (.008) 
  
*
1 λ   -0.091 (.009) 
  
*
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Descriptive Statistics for Figure 1 
 























                
2500 10.59  9.62 9.88 10.07 10.36 10.62 10.85 11.06 11.19 11.42
 
 















Descriptive Statistics for Figure 2 
 























                  
10305 10.17  9.02 9.32 9.51 9.87 10.23 10.47 10.72 10.84 11.17  
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Table 6 




 Coefficient  Std.  Error 
dlnw 5.66  (1.13) 
age 2.57  (0.49) 
agesq -0.21  (0.08) 
yrssch 2.86  (0.54) 
dep1 -0.22  (0.05) 
dep2 -0.24  (0.05) 
dep3 -0.21  (0.05) 





First Selection Index 
(Application 
Decision) 
married 0.49  (0.09) 
 constant  -14.44  (1.92) 
 Coefficient  Std.  Error 
age -1.08  (0.19) 
yrssch 0.87  (0.13) 
exec 0.51  (0.08) 
prof 0.45  (0.07) 
techn -0.1  (0.09) 
sales -0.36  (0.08) 
service -0.13  (0.08) 










  constant 1.3  (1.6) 
  rho( 4 ,ε ε )  -0.44 (0.21) 
 N  12,805 
 
Note: Estimation results from a bivariate probit model with partial 
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